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The Right Moment to Reform the EU Budget 
Peter Becker 
The High Level Group on Own Resources (HLGOR) chaired by Mario Monti presented 
its final report on 17 January 2017. It contains recommendations for reform of the Euro-
pean Union’s own resources system. In October 2016, as part of its mid-term review of 
the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF 2014-2020), the European Commission 
marked starting points for reforms on the expenditure side of the EU budget. Now, the 
EU is turning its attention to the revenue side. The European Commission must draw 
up its proposals for the next MFF, applicable after 2020, by the end of 2017. The debate 
on a comprehensive reorganisation of European budget policy will then begin to 
gather speed. 
 
The European budget system has slowly 
developed into a long process of path 
dependency since 1988. Many parts of the 
system, with its entrenched mechanisms 
and structures, have now become obsolete 
and are in need of reform. The immense 
difficulties the EU faced in appropriately 
and effectively responding to the recent 
crises and challenges have exposed the 
weaknesses of European budgetary policy. 
The EU should, therefore, now take the 
opportunity to reform and not, as so often 
happens, continue with the status quo by 
seeking compromise based on the lowest 
common denominator. The need for change 
is further reinforced by two aspects: 
1. The advent of Brexit, the exit of one 
of the biggest contributors in recent years, 
increases pressure to reform both the rev-
enue and the expenditure side. At present, 
it appears inconceivable that the remaining 
net contributors will close the income gap 
whilst retaining current spending priorities 
and financial volumes. Conversely, it is equal-
ly unrealistic to simply reduce the EU budget 
by the volume of British payments and 
reduce percentage spending priorities ac-
cordingly, with the associated consequences 
for individual Member States. Rather, the 
EU must discuss appropriately reallocating 
the additional financial burdens arising 
from the departure of the UK from the EU. 
At the same time, the British rebate and 
all rebates on the rebate associated with 
this special arrangement will no longer 
apply after Brexit. This increases the pres-
sure to abandon any exceptions, corrections 
and special regulations when reforming the 
EU budget system – on the revenue side as 
well as on the expenditure side. 
2. The EU-27 are committed to the com-
mon goal of protecting and consolidating 
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the cohesion and unity of the European 
Union. However, MFF negotiations always 
involve serious distributional conflicts in 
which conflicting interests and disputes 
between Member States come to light – 
something that, at least, will not promote 
EU cohesion. The current migration crisis 
and the continuing consequences of the 
deep economic and social crisis in the euro 
area have also torn open new lines of con-
flict that continue to exacerbate existing 
disagreements between net contributors 
and net recipients. Italy’s continued refusal 
to approve the compromise on reform 
proposals debated in the context of the MFF 
mid-term review showed how closely these 
differences – also on factual issues – are 
linked to MFF negotiations. Italy justified 
its blockade by pointing to the refusal 
of many central and eastern European 
Member States to implement the agreed 
distribution of refugees. 
Remit and Findings of the 
Monti Group 
The final report of the HLGOR now triggers 
the process of discussing the starting points, 
objectives and need for a reform of Euro-
pean budgetary policy on the revenue side. 
In negotiating the current Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2014-2020, the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) in particular had 
pushed for a reform of the EU own re-
sources system and the introduction of an 
EU tax. However, in the face of resistance 
from the majority of Member States, Par-
liament was only able to establish the High 
Level Group on Own Resources. The review 
of the current system of own resources 
is intended to be based on the principles 
of simplicity, transparency, justice and 
democratic legitimacy. The group, con-
sisting of three representatives each from 
the European Commission, the EP and 
the Council of Ministers, was completely 
independent and arbitrarily extended the 
scope of its original mandate. In its report, 
the Monti Group recommends a compre-
hensive structural reform of the EU budget 
with renewed focus on spending as well as 
on revenues. 
At the heart of the final report is the 
attempt to solve the basic problem of cur-
rent EU budget policy and to stop thinking 
in terms of net balance categories. There-
fore, to overcome this net balance logic, 
a more comprehensive assessment of the 
costs and benefits of EU membership might 
be required. According to the Monti-group, 
the EU budget is an ‘investment budget’ 
and not a ‘zero-sum game’ in which gains 
for one Member State automatically mean 
losses for another. A contribution to the EU 
budget should not be considered a cost but 
an investment in common public goods. 
The working approach of the group re-
flected this search to find a way out of the 
political impasse of European net balance 
logic: 
1. The Monti Group sought to gain an 
impression of the willingness to implement 
reforms and the available scope of those 
reforms through a number of discussions 
with members of the EP and national par-
liaments as well as with researchers and 
budgetary policy experts. All participating 
institutions should commit themselves, at 
least in principle, to a truly comprehensive 
reorganisation of European budget policy. 
2. By extending its analysis and recom-
mendations on the expenditure side of the 
EU budget, the HLGOR attempted to put 
together a larger negotiating package. This 
package should contain benefits for every 
actor and institution. The more the report 
advocates reforms on the revenue side, the 
more convincing its arguments for changes 
on the expenditure side should be. 
As a consequence, the HLGOR placed 
the concept of ‘European added value’ at 
the centre of its report. In future, European 
added value should be the main criterion 
for assessing the appropriateness and legiti-
macy of the EU budget. The report’s mes-
sage was that only by looking at both sides 
of the balance sheet will we be able to 
recognise and precisely identify this Euro-
pean added value. The group defined 
European added value as the increase of 
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values arising through the actions of the 
European Union in addition to the actions 
of the Member States. However, given the 
limited resources of the EU budget, it seems 
inevitable that the policy fields would be 
given differing priorities depending on 
where such added value is best achieved. 
On the expenditure side, the EU budget 
should, therefore, focus on areas where the 
greatest European added value is to be ex-
pected or where promoting central public 
goods can only be achieved through joint 
European action. This would be the case, 
for example, in areas of internal and ex-
ternal security or in spending on research 
and development that generate new jobs 
and additional growth. 
As a precondition for its reform pro-
posals, the Monti Group committed itself 
to sticking to existing EU primary law, 
meaning that all the group’s recommenda-
tions were to be implemented within the 
framework of the current Treaty of Lisbon, 
requiring no changes to it. Hence, the 
group does not call into question either 
unanimity when approving decisions on 
own resources, as stipulated in Article 311 
of the Treaty, or the EU’s prohibition on 
borrowing. It also does not demand the EU 
has its own competence to tax European 
citizens or call for an increase in the total 
volume of the budget. Rather, the HLGOR 
advocates retaining the proven guidelines 
of the current own resources system, such 
as the principle of budgetary balance, and 
also retaining current traditional own 
resources (i.e. customs revenues and sugar 
levies) or own resources based on gross 
national income (GNI). However, all cur-
rently granted exceptions to this system 
in the form of rebates or corrective mecha-
nisms should, in the group’s opinion, be 
abolished; Brexit will offer the perfect 
opportunity to achieve this. 
The Monti Group sees a particular diffi-
culty in the fact that own resources are not 
uniformly recognised in the Member States’ 
national budgets. Sometimes they are de-
clared as government spending, as pay-
ments to international organisations and, 
in some countries, only the net balance 
of cash flows is included in the national 
budget. However, financing the EU should 
not be considered a national burden. Rather, 
these are financial resources owed to the 
EU to accomplish common objectives. The 
first step, therefore, is to clearly and uni-
formly specify own resources in national 
budgets in order to ensure the transparency 
and comparability of EU funding. 
In a second step, the group then advo-
cates establishing new own resources for 
the EU. However, these should not simply 
serve to generate new revenue for the EU, 
but also have a political incentive effect, 
namely, by helping to more effectively 
achieve the EU’s political objectives and 
thus enhance European added value. The 
group argued that, of course, each new 
source would have both advantages and 
disadvantages; as a result, there can be no 
ideal option for new own resources. Hence, 
a comprehensive and sustainable reform of 
the own resources system ought to be based 
on a combination of various new revenue 
streams. 
In its report, the HLGOR details a wide 
range of possible new own resources from 
production, consumption and environmen-
tal policies. Possible revenues might in-
clude a combination of a reformed value-
added tax, a European corporation tax 
(based on a common consolidated corpo-
rate tax) and the European financial trans-
action tax (FTT) or alternatively a banking 
levy. Various new revenue sources might 
come from environment policy, including a 
form of energy taxation, for example, a CO2 
levy, a tax on electricity, a fuel tax or a tax 
on EU emission trading. A reform of the 
revenue mix should increase the financial 
contribution from today’s traditional own 
resources by around one-fifth to more than 
half of revenue. Against that, transfers from 
national budgets in the form of GNI own 
resources, which are based on the national 
wealth of each Member State, could be 
reduced significantly. 
Finally, in its report, the group also ad-
vocates the possibility of incorporating a 
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géometrie variable into European budgetary 
policy and calls for a separate Euro zone 
budget which should serve to stabilise the 
common currency and the Euro zone. 
Two Further Elements of Reform 
The next reform debate must also find 
solutions for two important issues that 
were not part of the HLGOR’s final report: 
Lack of Flexibility in the EU Budget 
The recent crises have revealed a lack of 
flexibility in European budgetary policy 
and the EU budget and thus the inability 
of Brussels to respond to political challenges 
with adequate resources and with new 
spending priorities. MFF headings and their 
financial resources are largely set irrespec-
tive of developments in the political en-
vironment. Currently, around 80 percent 
of the EU budget is already fixed for seven 
years at the beginning of the MFF period 
and this means that it is very difficult for 
the EU to respond to unforeseen challenges. 
If, however, the intention is to enable the 
EU to respond appropriately to new devel-
opments in future, there are basically two 
options: 
1. The EU will need to have extensive 
reserves at its disposal which it can fall 
back on in times of crisis and when a fast 
response is required. This seems to be the 
approach favoured by the European Com-
mission. However, this solution could mean 
that EU Member States must either transfer 
funds which may be used only in an emer-
gency and remain unused until a crisis 
occurs, or the Member States must give 
firm commitments to make the promised 
funds available to the EU immediately in 
emergency situations. 
2. The EU will need to have far more 
comprehensive options for reallocating 
funds within its budget than has been the 
case to date. This could mean that the com-
mitment of funds, for instance, for eligible 
regions or for farms would only be binding 
until a crisis occurs that requires political 
priorities and also budgetary priorities to 
be redefined. 
Obviously, both options have advantages 
and disadvantages. While the provision of 
reserves is likely to cause national finance 
ministries to doubt whether a crisis really 
is significant enough to unlock reserves, 
conversely, the reserves would provide a 
constant incentive for the Union’s institu-
tions not to leave this money unused. In 
the case of larger or more protracted crises, 
Member States would also have to be con-
cerned about having to pay more funds on 
top of those reserves already made available. 
In contrast, the redeployment option 
would initially mean that payments by 
Member States to the EU budget would not 
increase and only in case of extreme crises 
might additional payments be required. 
Conversely, approved funds from the EU 
budget would then be up for grabs again, 
affecting the planning security of European 
funding. A reallocation would be always 
associated with losses that would affect 
some Member States or specific policies or 
sectors of the economy. In times of crisis, 
this could lead to delays and EU-internal 
conflicts over redistribution and allocation 
when rapid and decisive action is required. 
In principle, there should be an option 
to adapt and modify MFF priorities and their 
funding as the result of a policy decision. 
The more comprehensive, wide-reaching 
and yet specific the pre-allocation of spend-
ing priorities in the EU budget are, the 
easier it should be to revise them. At the 
same time, the crisis reserve should be in-
creased so that in acute situations Brussels 
can react quickly to implement policy deci-
sions without the need to seek consensus. 
The EU must also find a way to increase 
its financial and hence political room for 
manoeuvre. Narrowing the range of pos-
sible reactions by pre-allocating the major-
ity of its resources would mean that the 
EU is imposing excessive and unnecessary 
political restrictions on itself. 
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Spending Is Not Efficient Enough 
Given the limitations on current and also 
future budgetary resources available to the 
EU, European budgetary policy will have 
to seek to use its scarce financial resources 
more efficiently: 
1. Spending should be significantly 
more targeted at the common objectives of 
the EU, i.e. toward European political added 
value. This is not only recommended by the 
Monti Group, but almost all observers have 
been calling for this for many years. 
2. The efficiency and control of fund 
management should be improved. Given 
the amounts paid out from European struc-
tural and agricultural funds, deadweight 
and fraud cannot be avoided. However, 
deadweight losses would certainly recede 
if only the poorest and most underdevel-
oped regions in the EU were eligible for EU 
funds. And evidence of fraudulent use will 
hopefully soon be pursued by a European 
Public Prosecutor resulting in those Euro-
pean funds being reimbursed. 
3. European and national funding 
should be more closely linked. European 
money should always be used to comple-
ment national funding and not replace it. 
Following this principle, the instruments 
of graduated national co-financing could 
become the rule for all European funding 
policies, including agricultural policy. An 
MFF reform of this kind would also make 
corresponding modifications of state aid 
law necessary. 
4. Currently, funds from the EU budget 
are primarily spent as grants. Greater use of 
innovative financial instruments, i.e. loans 
or credit, could allow for multiple use of 
limited European resources. One innovative 
example is the Juncker fund for strategic 
investments. 
Persuading Reform Sceptics 
The political effectiveness of the final 
report and its influence on agenda-setting 
and forming opinions among the main 
actors of the MFF negotiation process will 
depend, firstly and in particular on the 
Member States’ willingness to change the 
current system and, secondly, on the per-
suasiveness of the reform recommenda-
tions forwarded by the HLGOR. 
The willingness to compromise and to 
fundamentally reform the European budget-
ary system is very limited among Member 
States for many reasons, particularly be-
cause of domestic politics. The initial views 
and assessments contained in the HLGOR’s 
final report are already showing up the 
traditional lines of conflict among Member 
States. The net contributors, such as the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Ger-
many simply acknowledged only some of 
the HLGOR proposals and saw their views 
confirmed that comprehensive reform was 
mainly required on the expenditure side 
and reform of the European system of own 
resources was unnecessary. By contrast, the 
Central and Eastern European net recipients 
stressed the need to continue with current 
spending policies and make appropriate 
financial resources available, particularly 
for European structural funds. In the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP), members of the budget 
committee supported the core recommen-
dations of the report and called for an end 
to net balance logic by opening up new and 
genuine sources of own resources. More-
over, MEPs questioned the need to restrict 
the MFF to one percent of EU GNI, given 
the various challenges and new tasks, the 
EU needs additional resources in order to 
achieve its goals. The foreseeable losses 
from one of the largest net contributors 
after Brexit should be offset by additional 
funds from new own resources. 
There seems to be a broad consensus 
and agreement with the recommendations 
of the Monti Group only on the question 
of abolishing own resources coupled with 
value added tax in Member States. Measur-
ing this source is exceedingly complicated 
and opaque and also, as a result of multiple 
adjustments, the revenues are dispropor-
tionately small compared to the costs of 
collecting and calculating them. 
The reluctance of Member States to im-
plement reform might be reversed if the 
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Monti Group’s proposals were able to over-
come reservations and scepticism through 
their consistency and persuasiveness. How-
ever, this does not seem to be the case. 
Although all stakeholders agree with the 
HLGOR’s argument to refocus the EU budget 
on creating European added value whilst 
respecting the principle of subsidiarity, this 
understanding is superficial. Unanswered 
questions remain as to what European added 
value might be, where it could be found 
and how it would be measured. Even the 
HLGOR’s proposal to fundamentally reform 
the own resources system with a new mix 
of revenue sources was received with scant 
approval from the Member States. Only 
Italy and Luxembourg support this core 
recommendation of the Monti Group. 
Despite the general aim of protecting the 
uniformity of the EU budget, the majority 
of Member States were sceptical of consid-
erations to allow new forms of differentia-
tion and to create a separate budget for the 
Euro zone. However, the receptiveness of 
governments whose taxpayers would have 
to pay for a special budget of this kind will be 
decisive in discussions about this proposal. 
It seems that the MFF negotiations will 
follow the same almost traditional lines of 
conflicts between net contributors and net 
recipients and between the Council and 
the European Parliament. There is still little 
willingness for comprehensive change 
among Member States, especially as the in-
dividual EU partners do not agree on a com-
mon analyses of the weaknesses of the own 
resources system, and therefore implicitly 
on naming the starting points for reform. 
The recommendations of the Monti 
Group are already under threat of being 
crushed by these traditional conflicts 
relating to distribution and legitimacy. 
As so many reports in the past, the HLGOR 
report might be acknowledged but then 
quickly disappear into a drawer. 
The ‘drawer solution’ would, however, 
not do justice to the quality and accuracy of 
the HLGOR’s proposals for reform of the EU 
budget and for rebalancing Member State 
and joint budgetary responsibilities. The 
Monti Group report contains some valuable 
starting points for redesigning the MFF 
which should be seriously considered and 
taken into account by Member States, the 
European Commission and European Par-
liament. 
The HLGOR’s approach of initiating a 
fundamental reform of the EU budget by 
making changes on both the revenue and 
on the expenditure side is supposed to en-
courage all those involved to become more 
willing to start implementing reform. Net 
contributors and particularly the largest 
among them, Germany, should reconsider 
their one-sided criticism of the lack of effi-
ciency and effectiveness in the Common 
Agricultural Policy and in European Struc-
tural Funds. Sometimes this criticism even 
goes so far as to call for these policies to be 
scrapped completely. Completely re-nation-
alising these spending policies anchored in 
European primary law would be impossible 
without changing the Lisbon Treaty any-
way. However, the mention and anchoring 
of these policies in the Lisbon Treaty says 
nothing about the financial resources or 
about the objectives and conditions that 
could be linked to these European funds. 
By the same token, net recipients should 
accept criticism of the lack of efficiency 
of their programmes funded by European 
Structural Fund and focus their arguments 
more on the joint objectives of the EU. The 
EP for its part should not only call for truly 
genuine European own resources, i.e. an EU 
tax, with the sole intention of increasing 
budget volumes without feeling responsible 
and bearing the political costs of this direct 
burden on European taxpayers. In addition, 
European parliamentarians must seriously 
commit to improving the efficiency and 
targeting of European funding policies. 
They should also resist the temptation to 
respond to the foreseeable financial conse-
quences of Brexit with a seemingly simple 
solution and to only call for compensation 
in the form of additional payment obliga-
tions from current net contributors, with-
out also naming spending programmes 
where savings could be achieved. 
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The Monti Group’s recommendation 
to link new EU own resources with policy 
steering effects could be a useful and ac-
ceptable compromise for all stakeholders. 
The group’s proposal to only spend funds 
from the EU budget on measures with the 
highest European added value deserves a 
closer assessment and the general support 
of all stakeholders. 
The precise definition of European added 
value, however, has been highly controver-
sial for many years and the Monti Group 
provides no general definition either. Cer-
tainly, focussing on a relative European 
added value, as proposed by the HLGOR, 
might offer a way out. Even within the two 
largest areas of expenditure (the Common 
Agricultural Policy and cohesion policy), 
European resources should continue to 
promote priority projects that will bring 
the EU closer to its political objectives and 
thereby promise considerable European 
added value. Instruments of concentration 
and conditionality already serve to pave the 
way for refocussing European Structural 
Funds on common goals and European 
added value. The Common Agricultural 
Policy also experienced a similar realign-
ment of funding priorities when it added 
a ‘greening’ component to common cli-
mate and energy policy goals. 
However, further measures are still pos-
sible as part of a gradual reinterpreting of 
the content of the largest areas of expendi-
ture in the EU budget. The hitherto domi-
nant re-distribution function of EU spend-
ing policies could be reduced gradually 
and the allocation function be given more 
prominence. 
Timetable and Next Steps 
The European Commission has until the 
end of 2017 to submit its proposal for a 
new MFF for the period after 2020. In doing 
so, it will review and undoubtedly take into 
account the recommendations of the Monti 
Group. The period of reflection has already 
begun, both within the Commission and 
the European Parliament and among the 
Member States of the EU-27. It will first 
be necessary to consensually agree on an 
assessment of the shortcomings of the 
current system. Without agreement on a 
joint analysis of flaws and weaknesses, it 
will be impossible to agree on starting 
points for change. 
Negotiations will then have to be con-
cluded by the end of 2019 or no later than 
the beginning of 2020. A certain overlap 
with this MFF negotiation process and nego-
tiating the terms of Brexit will be unavoid-
able. In addition, there may be links between 
the two negotiation processes, for example, 
cushioning possible burdens on individual 
EU-27 members as a result of the withdrawal 
of the UK from the Single Market and the 
Customs Union with EU funds. 
Germany, the largest Member State, 
will need to focus on maintaining cohesion 
among the EU-27 countries in both nego-
tiating arenas. The largest net contributor 
will need to prepare itself to take on addi-
tional financial burdens for this goal to 
be achieved. During negotiations, Germany 
should be careful that its willingness in 
principle to take on additional financial 
burdens in the short term is not linked to a 
decision on the long-term structural reform 
of the EU budget. A reform of this kind must 
include a refocussing of European spending 
priorities as well as an overhaul of the own 
resources system. Whatever changes are 
proposed, forms of differentiation must not 
undermine the principle of budget uni-
formity. 
In principle, the objective should be for 
the EU to extend the scope for decision and 
policy-making in its budgetary policy and 
to become less dependent on the goodwill 
of its Member States. 
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